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INTRODUCTION TO LOTTERY GAMES
“Lotto” is among the most popular games offered by state lottery associations, 
accounting for roughly one-quarter of total revenues for state-run U.S. lotteries in 
the late 1990s and early 2000s. As of July 2005, 40 states had lotteries, and every 
state association offered some version of a lotto game either through their own game 
or through a multi-state association such as the twenty-seven member Multi-State 
Lottery Association (Powerball) or the twelve state Mega Millions association.
Lotto games generally consist of an individual picking a set of ﬁ  ve or six numbers 
from a group of approximately 35-55 choices. Winning numbers are then randomly 
selected at a weekly or bi-weekly drawing. A player whose ticket matches all of the 
winning numbers wins the jackpot prize while players matching some, but not all, of 
the winning numbers win smaller consolation prizes. In part, lotto derives its popu-
larity from the large jackpot prizes that can be won in this game. While other lottery 
games such as instant tickets, numbers, or keno might offer top prizes ranging from 
$100 to $100,000, lotto games typically advertise jackpot prizes starting at $1 million 
or higher. 
The jackpot prize is funded by allocating a percentage of ticket sales to the jackpot 
prize pool. If no ticket matches the winning numbers, the money in the pool is carried 
over into the next drawing and is added to the allocated funds from ticket sales in the 
next period. Because the jackpot prize pool is allowed to roll-over in this manner, the 
grand prize can become quite large if no one hits the jackpot in a large number of suc-
cessive periods. Indeed, advertised jackpots exceeding $50 million are quite common, 
and occasionally lotto jackpots have been known to exceed $250 million. 
Because lotto is one of the few games of chance where the expected return varies 
with each drawing, these games have been widely studied in the academic literature, 
and the theory on buyer behavior and ticket payoffs is well-established. While nu-
merous researchers have proposed the possibility that under speciﬁ  c conditions the 
lottery may present bettors with a “fair bet,” that is, a gamble with a positive expected 
return, their conclusions are generally based either solely on supposition or on the 
examination of just one or two lotto games. This paper uses expected payoff functions 674 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
developed in other research to answer the empirical question of whether lotteries 
actually are ever fair bets based on an extensive data set. In addition, the notion of 
whether it is ever possible to earn positive expected returns from purchasing every 
possible number combination is explored in depth. 
EXPECTED PAYOFFS FROM LOTTERIES
Testing whether lotto games present a fair bet requires an estimate of the expected 
return from the purchase of a lottery ticket. Several researchers have presented esti-
mates of this expected return starting with Clotfelter and Cook [1989] and including 
DeBoer [1990], Krautmann and Ciecka [1993], Shapira and Venezia [1992], Scott and 
Gulley [1993, 1995], and Matheson [2001].
Since the price of a lotto ticket and the odds of winning remain ﬁ  xed regardless of 
the size of the jackpot, it is natural to assume that the expected return of purchasing 
a lotto ticket will increase along with the size of the jackpot. The complicating factor, 
however, is that as the advertised jackpot grows, the number of ticket buyers typically 
increases as well. The increased number of ticket buyers increases the probability 
that the winning numbers will be shared by two or more tickets. Thus, the increase in 
expected return due to the increase in the size of the jackpot is tempered by the pros-
pect of potentially having to share this larger jackpot among several winners. While 
this phenomenon does reduce the expected value of a ticket, as shown by Matheson 
and Grote [2004], ticket purchases almost never rise so rapidly in the face of a high 
jackpot that the expected value of a ticket falls despite an increase in the jackpot. In 
other words, if the jackpot is not won during a particular drawing, the jackpot in the 
next period will increase due to additions to the jackpot pool and the expected value 
of a ticket will increase due to this higher jackpot. The expected value of the ticket 
will rise more slowly than the jackpot, however, because of the increase in ticket sales 
that higher jackpots generally generate. Still, the observed net change in the expected 
return will almost always be positive. 
Following Matheson [2001], who presents the most detailed function, the expected 
return, ERt, from the purchase of a single lottery ticket with randomly selected num-
bers is shown in equation (1).
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where wi is the probability of winning lower-tier prize i, Vit is the cash value of lower-
tier prize i at time t, wj is the probability of winning the jackpot prize, AVjt is the 
advertised jackpot prize at time t, dvrt is a divisor used to convert the advertised an-
nuitized jackpot into a net present value, Bt is the number of other ticket buyers for 
the drawing in period t, θ is the tax rate, and τ is the price of a ticket.
It is a fact that certain combinations of numbers (multiples of 7, birthdays, verti-
cal or diagonal columns on the play slip, etc.) are more commonly played than other 
combinations, and therefore by playing rarer combinations a ticket buyer can earn 
an expected return above this average expected payout. The ability to earn above 675 IN SEARCH OF A FAIR BET IN THE LOTTERY
normal returns is limited by the amount to which the distribution of numbers played 
deviates from a uniform distribution. Since roughly 70 percent of all lotto tickets 
sold use computer generated numbers, which can be reasonably assumed to follow 
a uniform distribution, any supernormal expected returns are limited to the devia-
tion from uniformity by the 30 percent of tickets that are sold to players who select 
their own numbers. Furthermore, as lotto jackpots grow, the percentage of players 
selecting their own numbers falls, further reducing any ability of players to select 
advantageous numbers during periods of high expected returns. Still, the expected 
value in equation (1) should be seen as lower bound for the game. See Clotfelter and 
Cook [1989, p. 81], MacLean, et al. [1992], or Thaler and Ziemba [1988] for further 
discussion. 
To test for fair bets in the lottery, data on jackpot size, ticket sales, and game 
format was collected from 34 state and multi-state lotto games representing over 
18,000 individual drawings. For each drawing, the wi’s and wj can be calculated in 
straight forward manner based on the game matrix of the speciﬁ  c lotto, and dvrt can 
be closely estimated using prevailing interest rates and the annuity length of the 
jackpot prize. The value of the lower-tier prizes is also available by examining the 
speciﬁ  c game rules, and the expected jackpot is widely advertised by lottery associa-
tions prior to each drawing. 
A marginal tax rate of θ = 30 percent was assumed for all drawings, although it 
must be noted that the nature of lottery players' behavior makes assigning a proper 
taxation rate difﬁ  cult. First, marginal tax rates vary from state to state and some 
lottery winnings are exempt from state taxation. In addition, federal tax rates have 
varied (while generally declining) over the time period of the data. Next, most lottery 
players are unlikely to claim small prizes and losses on their tax returns, and lot-
tery authorities are not required to report winnings of less than $600 to government 
tax agencies. Finally, winning a jackpot prize is very likely to cause a typical lottery 
player to move from a lower tax bracket to a higher one so that the marginal tax rate 
in equation (1) is not symmetric between winning and losing. There is no easy way 
around these difﬁ  culties, but the net effect of these inﬂ  uences makes it likely that a 
30 percent tax rate overstates the effective tax rate for lower-tier prizes and for the 
tax deduction that players can take from the purchase of non-winning tickets, while 
perhaps slightly understating the tax rate when the jackpot prize is won. Obviously, 
the use of a different tax rate or a more complicated taxation structure would cause 
some of the drawings on the margin to change from positive to negative or vice versa, 
but the status of the vast majority of the drawings, both positive and negative, will 
be unchanged. 
A true representation of the ex ante expected value of purchasing a lottery ticket 
requires that the player be able to make an accurate estimation of the number of 
other ticket buyers. In order to facilitate the examination of a large number of lotto 
games, this paper will instead examine the ex post expected return from the purchase 
of a lotto ticket based on actual ticket sales rather than buyer forecasted ticket sales. 
While it is certainly true that the ex post and ex ante ticket sales (and hence ex post 
and ex ante returns) may differ from one another if players inaccurately estimate 
ticket sales, previous research has found that players can quite closely estimate ticket 676 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
sales and do not generally make systematic forecasting errors [Scott and Gulley, 1995; 
Matheson and Grote, 2003]. Given these results, it can be said that the ex ante and 
ex post estimates approximately match one another on any individual drawing and 
that on average over many drawings will exactly match. Indeed, some scholars would 
argue that equilibrium in the lotto market should be deﬁ  ned by the level of sales such 
that ex ante and ex post estimates exactly match one another. In any case, for simply 
ascertaining the relative frequency of fair bets in the lottery, the ex post method gives 
a good approximation with a signiﬁ  cant reduction in computational difﬁ  culty. 
 TABLE  1
  Expected Returns for Single Ticket purchase
    Highest  Max.  Expected  # of  # of  %Positive 
Lottery  Dates of Data  Observed  Return (per  Draws  Positive  Draws
   Jackpot  $1.00  played)    Draws 
Multi-state "Powerball"  4/22/92 - 1/15/03  $315 million  $0.727  1,121  0  0%
Multi-state "Big Game"  9/06/96 - 5/04/99  $190 million  $0.776  215  0  0%
Tri-State "Megabucks"  3/12/97 - 5/29/99  $8.2 million  $0.719  214  0  0%
Tri-State "Win Cash"  9/12/97 - 5/28/99  $2.33 million  $0.973  179  0  0%
Tri-West "Lotto"  2/04/95 - 1/31/98  $1.63 million  $1.067  307  2  0.7%
Multi-state "Wild Card"  2/04/98 - 7/28/01  $2.06 million  $0.681  364  0  0%
Arizona "Lotto"  11/28/98 - 5/22/99  $10.1 million  $0.921  51  0  0%
California "Super Lotto"  10/18/86 - 1/19/02  $141 million  $0.753  1,544  0  0%
Colorado "Lotto"  9/14/90 - 7/28/01  $27 million  $0.977  1,150  0  0%
Connecticut "Lotto"  9/20/94 - 8/07/01  $26 million  $1.251  719  10  1.4%
Delaware "All Cash"  10/27/98 - 5/18/99  $1.13 million  $0.888  88  0  0%
Florida "Lotto"  5/07/88 - 7/28/01  $106.5 million  $0.945  783  0  0%
Georgia "Lotto"  8/31/96 - 8/04/01  $30.4 million  $1.027  258  1  0.4%
Illinois  4/14/99 - 8/01/01  $33 million  $1.253  241  6  2.5%
Indiana  9/03/94 - 8/01/01  $42 million  $1.292  542  9  1.7%
Kansas "Cash"  8/18/96 - 5/12/99  $2.00 million  $1.565  428  21  4.9%
Kentucky "Lotto"  3/01/95 - 7/28/01  $20 million  $1.444  670  29  4.3%
Louisiana  4/19/98 - 5/22/99  $2.05 million  $0.660  114  0  0%
Maryland  1/03/98 - 7/14/99  $18.5 million  $1.144  160  5  3.1%
Mass. "Megabucks"  11/05/97 - 8/11/01  $14.3 million  $1.340  394  21  5.3%
Mass. "Millions"  11/06/97 - 8/13/01  $30.6 million  $1.145  394  6  1.5%
Michigan "Lotto"  9/04/96 - 7/28/01  $40 million  $1.159  497  10  2.0%
Minnesota "Gopher 5"  5/24/91 - 7/24/01  $1.40 million  $0.918  1,062  0  0%
Missouri "Lotto"  1/03/96 - 6/30/01  $11.6 million  $1.546  459  22  4.8%
New Jersey   7/03/95 - 4/05/99  $35 million  $1.086  393  1  0.3%
New York  4/14/99 - 8/01/01  $45 million  $0.691  375  0  0%
Ohio "Super Lotto"  1/12/91 - 7/28/01  $54 million  $1.004  1,099  1  0.1%
Oregon "Lotto"  4/19/95 - 5/19/01  $18 million  $2.204  636  32  5.0%
Pennsylvania "Pick 6"  9/12/98 - 8/04/01  $73 million  $0.843  303  0  0%
South Dakota "Cash"  7/03/96 - 8/11/01  $0.34 million  $0.884  530  0  0%
Texas "Lotto"  11/14/92 - 1/15/03  $85 million  $0.969  1,061  0  0%
Virginia "Lotto"  1/27/90 - 5/05/99  $28 million  $1.168  929  6  0.7%
Washington   1/01/97 - 5/26/99  $24 million  $1.042  251  2  0.8%
Wisconsin  6/20/92 - 5/15/99  $16.5 million  $0.812  721  0  0%
Total       18,252  184  1.0%
Note: The "Highest Observed Jackpot" and "Max. Expected Return" may or may not correspond to the same 
drawing depending on factors such as the drawings' ticket sales, changes in prize structure, etc.677 IN SEARCH OF A FAIR BET IN THE LOTTERY
The results presented in Table 1 both conﬁ  rm and counter the prevailing literature. 
Overall, it is shown that fair bets are indeed very rare occurrences with roughly 1 
percent of drawings providing a player with a fair bet. This satisﬁ  es a common deﬁ  -
nition of rationality in gambling markets that games of chance should never present 
the player with a positive return. [e.g., Scott and Gulley, 1995] 
On the other hand, the instances of fair bets may be signiﬁ  cantly more common 
than previously believed. Half of the games studied showed at least one instance 
of a fair bet, and numerous games provided players with even odds on a relatively 
frequent basis. Several of the states exhibited even odds in 4 percent or more of the 
drawings. 
It is particularly noteworthy that among the lotteries providing fair bets, several 
have maximum net expected payoffs well in excess of the price of the ticket with 
Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky and Missouri having a maximum expected gain of 40 
percent or more and Oregon having a maximum expected return of over $2.20 on the 
purchase of a single one dollar ticket. These results conﬂ  ict with widely held notions 
of efﬁ  ciency in gambling markets in that persistent positive returns should induce 
a large increase in ticket purchases resulting in lower expected returns for each in-
dividual drawing and resulting in jackpots being more frequently won, eliminating 
long runs of positive drawings. 
Another fact that can be observed in Table 1 is that lotteries with positive maxi-
mum expected payoffs tend to be in smaller states and particularly in states that 
offer both a state lotto game with lower average jackpots and a multi-state game 
with much larger jackpots. As hypothesized by Forrest, et al. [2002], players seem to 
react to big jackpots rather than big expected returns, again an apparent violation of 
rationality by ticket buyers.
This apparent violation of rationality is most easily explained by the concept of 
bounded rationality. For small gambles like a $1.00 lottery ticket, infrequent lotto 
players are likely to purchase tickets based upon limited information. In states with 
two games, media attention and in-store advertising is generally focused on the game 
offering the largest jackpot, and, therefore, it is much easier for a casual buyer to 
realize when this game’s jackpot reaches an abnormally high level. The multi-state 
game thus attracts a large number of new buyers when the jackpot rises diminish-
ing the expected value of the ticket. On the other hand, a relatively large increase in 
the jackpot of the state game may escape the attention of most players since even a 
record-high state game jackpot may still be smaller than a typical Powerball or Mega 
Millions prize. Therefore, players react to higher jackpots in the smaller state games 
with only slightly higher ticket purchases. Smaller games with potentially positive 
expected returns go largely unnoticed by many consumers in the shadow of nominally 
more impressive multi-state jackpots. States with independent games that do not 
participate in either of the big multi-state consortiums also experience few instances 
of positive expected returns. By similar reasoning, without another game to eclipse the 
advertised jackpot of the state game, ticket sales in these states are highly responsive 
to the jackpot, and bettors, therefore, “arbitrage away” any positive returns. 678 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
Another potential explanation for why jackpots rather than expected values seem 
to drive ticket sales in some games derives from the idea that a portion of the value of 
a lottery ticket is potentially non-monetary in nature, a hypothesis offered by many 
researchers to explain why otherwise risk averse consumers engage in gambling in the 
ﬁ  rst place. A lotto drawing with a large jackpot has a high psychological value even 
if it has a low expected return so that the eye-popping jackpots offered by the largest 
lotto games attract large numbers of tickets buyers. This non-monetary value of large 
jackpots also explains why more bettors do not switch away from the multi-state game 
to the state game in the presence of positive expected returns in the smaller game. 
Dreaming about winning $100 million is more fun than dreaming about winning $5 
million even if the smaller game offers a relatively better expected return.
Grote and Matheson [2006] go even further in exploring the notion of substitut-
ability between lotto games. They ﬁ  nd that in lottery associations offering both a state 
and a multi-state game, during periods of high jackpots (and therefore high expected 
returns) in the multi-state game, ticket sales increase for the state game as well. 
Rather than being substitutes, competing lotto games appear to be complements, 
further raising the question of efﬁ  ciency and rationality in lotto markets.
Again, a psychological explanation is in order. The excitement generated by a large 
multi-state jackpot allows players to overcome any psychological or moral barriers 
they have to playing a game of chance. Once that barrier falls, the effective price of 
other gambling options such as the smaller lotto game also falls. In addition, since 
state and multi-state lottery tickets are generally sold in the same locations, a large 
increase in the number of multi-state ticket buyers increases the number of potential 
state lotto game buyers as well. These factors increase demand for the state lotto game 
and outweigh any substitution effects of regular state lotto game players temporarily 
switching away to the multi-state game.
EXPECTED PAYOFFS FROM THE “TRUMP TICKET”
It has been suggested that there may be conditions during which it may be proﬁ  t-
able to corner a lottery game by purchasing every possible combination of numbers 
for a given drawing. Krautman and Ciecka [1993] and Matheson [2001] dub this 
strategy the “Trump Ticket.” Estimating the expected payoffs requires some additional 
calculations. A good starting assumption is that other lottery players’ decisions on 
whether to buy tickets remain constant regardless of whether another player buys 
the Trump Ticket. 
Under this assumption, the purchase of a Trump Ticket does not affect the prob-
ability of any single ticket winning the jackpot nor does it change the expected number 
of winning tickets among the other buyers in the particular drawing. The purchase 
does, however, increase the size of the jackpot that the jackpot winner(s) receives. 
Since the purchase of the Trump Ticket necessitates a large purchase of tickets, if a 
speciﬁ  c portion of ticket sales is allocated to the jackpot prize pool, as in most games, 
the purchase of the Trump Ticket will cause a signiﬁ  cant increase in the size of the 
jackpot. Mathematically, AVjt
TT = AVjt + ταjdvrt / wj where AVjt
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jackpot after the purchase of the Trump Ticket and αj is the percentage of gross sales 
allocated to the jackpot pool. Since all number combinations are chosen under a Trump 
Ticket strategy, it is not necessary to assume that other players’ number selections 
are uniformly distributed.
The issue of taxation again must be considered. As with the purchase of a single 
ticket, any winnings are fully taxable at the rate θ, but the Trump Ticket purchaser 
may deduct the cost of the tickets purchased to the extent of any winnings. If the 
purchaser's winnings exceed the cost of the Trump Ticket then the winnings less the 
cost of the Trump Ticket are taxable. If the purchaser's winnings are less than the 
cost of the Trump Ticket, then the full cost of the Trump Ticket is not deductible, but 
the purchaser will not have to pay taxes on any of the prizes, either.
 TABLE  2
  Expected returns for the Trump Ticket purchase
  Max.  Expected  Max.  Expected  # of  # of   %Positive
Lottery Return:  Single  Return:  Trump  Draws  Positive  Draws
 Ticket  Ticket    Draws 
Powerball $0.727  $1.036  1,121  10  0.9%
Big Game  $0.776  $1.120  215  2  0.9%
Tri- Megabucks  $0.719  $1.114  214  3  1.4%
Tri- Win Cash  $0.973  $1.443  179  33  18.4%
Tri-West $1.067  $1.590  307  67  21.8%
Wild Card  $0.681  $1.234  364  21  5.8%
Arizona $0.921  $1.434  51  14  27.5%
California $0.753  $1.109  1,544  7  0.5%
Colorado $0.977  $1.397  1,150  91  7.9%
Connecticut $1.251  $1.767  719  202  28.1%
Delaware $0.888  $1.438  88  30  34.1%
Florida $0.945  $1.321  783  23  2.9%
Georgia $1.027  $1.368  258  28  10.9%
Illinois $1.257  $1.745  241  43  17.8%
Indiana $1.292  $1.812  542  86  15.9%
Kansas $1.565  $2.055  428  93  21.7%
Kentucky $1.444  $2.014  670  227  33.9%
Louisiana $0.660  $0.982  114  0  0%
Maryland $1.144  $1.545  160  45  28.1%
Mass Mega  $1.340  $1.764  394  87  22.1%
Mass Millions  $1.145  $1.630  394  145  36.8%
Michigan $1.159  $1.488  497  60  12.1%
Minnesota $0.918  $1.338  1,062  76  7.2%
Missouri $1.546  $1.911  459  102  22.2%
New Jersey  $1.086  $1.531  393  27  6.9%
New York  $0.691  $1.043  375  3  0.8%
Ohio $1.004  $1.281  1,099  48  4.4%
Oregon $2.204  $2.498  636  96  15.1%
Pennsylvania $0.853  $1.173 303  27  8.9%
South Dakota  $0.884  $1.330  530  34  6.4%
Texas $0.969  $1.189  1,061  52  4.9%
Virginia $1.168  $1.670  929  127  13.7%
Washington $1.042  $1.305  251  19  7.6%
Wisconsin $0.812  $1.360  721  84  11.7%
Total     18,252  2,012  11.0%680 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
Table 2 shows the maximum expected return per dollar played for both a single 
ticket and a Trump Ticket purchase for every lotto game as well as the number of 
Trump Ticket drawings providing a fair bet. In comparing Tables 1 and 2, the ﬁ  rst obvi-
ous conclusion is that Trump Ticket purchases are more often associated with positive 
expected returns than are single ticket purchases. As noted by Matheson [2001], under 
the assumption that other players’ behavior is unchanged, the purchase of a Trump 
Ticket always has a higher expected return per dollar played than the purchase of a 
single ticket for two reasons. First, the purchase of the Trump Ticket increases the 
size of the jackpot without changing the expected number of other players matching 
the jackpot ticket leading to a higher expected payout from the grand prize. Second, 
because the purchase of the Trump ticket guarantees at least a share in the winning 
jackpot (as well as lower tier prizes), the purchaser of the Trump Ticket has a much 
higher chance of being able to deduct the price of the tickets from applicable taxes 
than the purchaser of a single ticket. Therefore, a signiﬁ  cantly greater number of the 
lotteries studied provide opportunities for positive expected returns for the Trump 
Ticket purchaser than for the single ticket purchaser. With only one exception, each 
lottery examined shows at least one instance of the Trump Ticket providing greater 
than even odds.
The other startling aspect of Table 2 is simply the extraordinarily high number of 
times that the Trump Ticket presents a fair bet. Overall, 11 percent of the drawings 
examined provided an even odds bet for the purchase of the Trump Ticket with one-
third of the games presenting a fair bet during at least 20 percent of draws. The size 
of the potential winnings is also surprising with many games offering an after-tax 
expected rate of return of over 50 percent at their highest point.
Of course, contrary to the primary assumption made in this analysis, other play-
ers' ticket buying behavior is, in fact, likely to be affected by the purchase of a Trump 
Ticket. The purchase of the Trump Ticket has the dual effect of simultaneously 
increasing the expected return to other players by increasing the size of the jackpot 
(since AVjt
TT = AVjt + τ αj dvrt / wj) and reducing the expected return by increasing the 
number of expected winners sharing the jackpot by one. Equation (2) shows the pre-
tax expected return from the jackpot portion of a lottery ticket when no Trump Ticket 
is purchased while equation (3) show the pre-tax expected return from the jackpot 
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The expected return for other players from the purchase of a Trump Ticket rises 
as long as the jackpot rises faster than the number of expected winners. This occurs 681 IN SEARCH OF A FAIR BET IN THE LOTTERY
when the advertised jackpot is low or the number of other expected winners (besides 
the Trump Ticket) is high. Speciﬁ  cally, as the number of other ticket buyers approaches 
zero, the Trump Ticket increases the expected payout to other players if AVjt / dvrt < τ 
αj / wj while as the number of other buyers becomes large, the Trump Ticket increases 
the expected payout to other players if (AVjt / dvrt + ταj/ wj) / αj < Bt.
Of course, a consortium will only ﬁ  nd the purchase of the Trump Ticket proﬁ  table 
when a high jackpot is combined with a low number of other expected winners, so 
although the purchase of a Trump Ticket can either increase or decrease the expected 
return to other players, it is likely that anytime a Trump Ticket represents a proﬁ  t-
able investment, the purchase of the Trump Ticket will result in a fall in the expected 
return to other players.
 FIGURE  1
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Figure 1 shows the combination of discounted jackpots and other ticket sales at 
which the net effect on the expected return to other players from the purchase of a 
single Trump Ticket is zero for a hypothetical lotto game with 10 million combina-
tions, a 33.3 percent contribution to the jackpot fund, and a 16.7 percent contribution 
to lower-tier prizes. In addition, the combinations of discounted jackpots and other 
ticket sales representing the breakeven point for the Trump Ticket to be a fair bet is 
also shown. As hypothesized, for every level of ticket sales, the jackpot required to 
make the Trump Ticket a proﬁ  table gamble is well in excess of the jackpot level at 
which the purchase of the Trump Ticket begins to reduce the expected return for other 
players. For example, if there are 10 million other ticket buyers, the purchase of the 
Trump Ticket will result in a reduction in the expected return for these buyers as long 
as the drawing's discounted jackpot (before additions from the purchase of the Trump 
Ticket) is more than $4.64 million while a consortium will only ﬁ  nd the purchase of 
the Trump Ticket proﬁ  table if the jackpot is greater than $10.88 million.
An examination of the observed levels of jackpots, ticket sales, and prize allocations 
in the 34 games examined in this study conﬁ  rms this ﬁ  nding in all cases. Thus, in 
situations where a consortium would ﬁ  nd the purchase of a Trump Ticket proﬁ  table, 682 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
the expected return to the other players in the game would fall which should lead to a 
reduction in ticket purchases by these other players. Of course, if the number of other 
tickets purchased falls, since the jackpot is above the breakeven point for additional 
ticket sales to decrease expected return, the fall in the expected number of other win-
ners is greater than the drop in the jackpot caused by these buyers exiting the market. 
Therefore, the expected return for the other players, including the purchaser of the 
Trump Ticket will rise. All in all, relaxing the assumption that ticket sales remain 
constant in the face of the purchase of a Trump Ticket would actually increase the 
number of observed draws in which the Trump Ticket provides a proﬁ  table gamble to 
the purchaser. In fact, the 11 percent ﬁ  gure quoted earlier as the proportion of draw-
ings representing a fair bet to the purchaser of a Trump Ticket should be seen as a 
lower bound, and fair bets are likely to be even more common than this.
By similar reasoning, if a second Trump Ticket is sold during a particular draw-
ing, given the assumption that the ﬁ  rst Trump Ticket would only be purchased if 
it represented a fair bet, the expected value to other ticket buyers, including the 
purchaser of the other Trump Ticket buyer, would fall. Therefore, under a scenario 
where the purchase of a Trump Ticket is a simple transaction, buyers would attempt 
to make the purchase as soon as the gamble had a positive expected value, but such a 
purchase would have a negative expected value if a second buyer also appeared. One 
might well wonder how the process would unfold by which one but only one purchaser 
would step forward in the face of a fair bet.
The most obvious solution to this puzzle is to realize that even the purchase of a 
Trump Ticket, which guarantees a share of the jackpot, is still a risky investment. 
For example, consider the previously examined hypothetical lotto game with 10 mil-
lion combinations, a 33.3 percent contribution to the jackpot fund, and a 16.7 percent 
contribution to lower-tier prizes. If there is a $12 million discounted jackpot (exclud-
ing the contributions from the Trump Ticket) and there are 10 million other ticket 
buyers (after accounting for changes in player behavior knowing that a Trump Ticket 
is being purchased), then the jackpot is $12 million plus one-third of $10 million or 
$15.33 million. The after-tax expected winnings from the purchase of a Trump Ticket 
is $10,586,635, a 5.9 percent return on a $10 million investment. However, the Trump 
Ticket results in a positive return only if no other winning tickets are sold in which 
case the player wins $15.33 million plus $1.67 million in lower tier prizes for a grand 
total of $17 million. If exactly one other winning ticket is sold, the purchaser of the 
Trump Ticket takes home only $9.33 million (half of $15.33 million plus the lower tier 
winnings), a 6.67 percent loss. With 10 million other ticket buyers, the purchaser of 
the Trump Ticket can count on being the sole winner only 36.8 percent of the time, so 
while the mean expected return is positive, the median return is negative.
With this understanding, as the jackpot of a lotto game grows, the expected value 
of the Trump Ticket rises. At some point above that at which the expected value turns 
positive, the least risk averse of the potential buyer consortiums will purchase the 
Trump Ticket. Once one purchaser steps forward, the fall in the expected value to other 
ticket buyers dissuades any further Trump Ticket purchases. Equilibrium is essentially 
a ﬁ  rst-mover game, but the ﬁ  rst-mover is deﬁ  ned as the least risk averse player. 683 IN SEARCH OF A FAIR BET IN THE LOTTERY
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If the purchase of a Trump Ticket consistently allows for supernormal rates of 
return, the real question is why one does not see attempts to corner lotto jackpots 
more often. The most likely reason is due to the transaction costs associated with 
the purchase of every number combination. The act of physically purchasing the 120 
million combinations required for the Powerball Lottery, for example, is a daunting 
task. In fact, in February 1992, an Australian consortium attempted to corner a $25 
million advertised jackpot in the Virginia Lotto. Despite a massive effort that included 
enlisting the aid of a major lottery ticket retailer, the consortium was only able to 
purchase 2.4 million of the 7,059,052 possible combinations before time ran out. 
The obvious solution to this problem would be for lottery associations to allow 
for the direct purchase of a Trump Ticket by any buyer who can “write the check” 
for every combination. In theory, lottery associations could increase total ticket sales 
by allowing such a purchase. For example, the jackpot for the Mass Millions game 
reached levels that would have allowed for the proﬁ  table purchase of the Trump 
Ticket during two separate runs in 1998. The purchase of the Trump Ticket in both 
of these cases would have led to two one-time ticket sales of roughly $14 million each. 
Total ticket sales for the Mass Millions game were $64 million in 1998. Of course, the 
purchase of the Trump Ticket would eliminate the potential for high ticket sales in 
subsequent drawings since the jackpot would revert to its beginning value following 
the consortium winning the prize. We estimate that this factor would have reduced 
ticket sales by approximately $22 million. The result is a net increase in ticket sales 
by the Mass Millions game of roughly $6 million or 10 percent. Similarly, Oregon ex-
perienced four runs in 1998 where the jackpot exceeded the threshold for a proﬁ  table 
purchase of the Trump Ticket. The purchase of the Trump Ticket in each case would 
result in an additional $14 million in ticket sales countered by a corresponding drop 
of $6 million due to lower average jackpots. The $8 million in estimated gains would 
have represented a 25 percent increase in the actual ticket sales for Oregon. 
In practice, no lottery association to our knowledge allows for such a direct pur-
chase, and some take active steps to prevent cornering the jackpot. Many associations, 
for example, prohibit lotto terminal operators from purchasing tickets themselves. 
This would prevent a consortium from applying to operate a large number of lottery 
ticket machines and then using these machines to complete the purchase of a Trump 
Ticket themselves.
Lottery associations discourage the purchase of the Trump Ticket for several rea-
sons. First, as noted previously, the purchase of the Trump Ticket would eliminate the 
potential for high ticket sales in subsequent drawings since the jackpot would revert 
to its beginning value following the consortium winning the prize. More importantly, 
however, the one-time ticket sale gains must be balanced against the possible loss 
of trust in the lottery by the public, who may feel that such a direct purchase is akin 
to “ﬁ  xing” the lottery. In addition, if ticket sales are fueled by stories of the “regular 
guy” hitting it big, it is likely that stories of rich investment consortiums getting even 
richer through taking advantage of such a direct purchase may depress sales further. 
Still, a policy allowing a direct Trump Ticket purchase may be intriguing to lottery 
associations, which have generally experienced ﬂ  at sales for many years.  684 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
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The results presented in this paper suggest that it is not only theoretically pos-
sible for lotteries to exhibit periods where the purchase of a single lottery ticket has 
a positive net present value, it is in fact a regular, though uncommon, occurrence for 
lotteries, especially in smaller states with more than one game, to exhibit this trait. 
Since the presence of a fair bet in the purchase of a single lottery ticket represents 
a violation of efﬁ  cient markets, lottery associations where fair bets routinely occur 
should be able to increase ticket sales in the presence of these higher expected returns 
through public education and better advertising of high jackpots.
Gamblers should also take note that while the huge jackpots associated with the 
large multi-state games attract the most media attention and the frenzied buying, 
the best returns to players occur in the smaller games where relatively large jackpots 
do not spur “lotto fever” and the associated reduction in the expected values. It may 
be more exciting to dream about winning one of the huge “mega-jackpots” offered by 
the bigger lotteries than winning a “mere” couple of million, but the “smart” money 
is on taking a chance on the smaller jackpots. 
In addition, it is extremely common that the purchase of the Trump Ticket, i.e. 
the purchase of all available combinations, would provide a fair bet to the buyer. Un-
fortunately, due to the difﬁ  culty of purchasing each individual number combination 
combined with the understandable reluctance of lottery associations to sell a Trump 
Ticket directly, these winning gambles will likely remain only hypothetical.
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